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The English City Riots of 2011, ‘Broken Britain’ and the Retreat into the Present 
 
Abstract 
The responses to the English city riots of 2011 bear a remarkable resemblance to those of 
historical urban disorders in terms of the way in which they are framed by concerns over 
"moral decline", "social malaise" and a "lack of self-restraint" among certain sections of the 
population.  In this paper we draw on the work of Norbert Elias and take a long-term 
perspective in exploring historical precedents and parallels relating to urban disorder and anti-
social behaviour.  We reject the notion of "Broken Britain" and argue that a more "detached" 
perspective is necessary in order to appreciate that perceived crises of civilisation are 
ubiquitous to the urban condition.  Through this historical analysis, framed by Elias' theory of 
involvement and detachment, we present three key arguments. Firstly, that a ‘retreat into the 
present’ is evident among both policy discourse and social science in responding to 
contemporary urban disorder, giving rise to ahistorical accounts and the romanticisation of 
previous eras; secondly, that particular moral panics have always arisen, specifically focused 
upon young and working class populations and urban disorder; and, thirdly, that previous 
techniques of governance to control these populations were often far more similar to 
contemporary mechanisms than many commentaries suggest.  We conclude by advocating a 
long-term, detached perspective in discerning historical precedents and their direct linkages to 
the present; and in identifying what is particular about today's concerns and responses relating 
to urban disorder. 
 
KEY WORDS: riots; urban disorder; governance of conduct; civility; incivility; "Broken Britain"; 
Norbert Elias. 
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Introduction 
“Has the cycle of prosperity and progress closed?” 
H.G. Wells (1927) 
 
Lord Byron’s maiden speech to the House of Lords in February 1812 focused on widespread 
disorder across Britain and argued that ‘arising from circumstances of the most unparalleled 
distress...nothing but absolute want could have driven a large, and once honest and industrious 
body of people, into the commission of excesses so hazardous to themselves, their families, and 
their communities’ (quoted in Adams, 2010, p.84).  
 
These tropes of unparalleled anxiety, a decline in honesty and work endeavour and actions 
damaging to rioters’ own communities, are remarkably similar to the discourses surrounding 
the riots in English cities in August 2011. The Prime Minister, David Cameron (2011) framed the 
UK coalition government’s response to the riots as a ‘social fight back’ within an understanding 
of ‘a complete absence of self-restraint’ and ‘a slow-motion moral collapse that has taken place 
in parts of our country these past few generations’, mirroring the response of Nicolas Sarkozy to 
the disturbances in French banlieues in 2005. The UK governmental response included harsh 
sentencing for those found guilty of involvement in the riots and extraordinary measures such 
as attempting to evict households linked to the riots from social housing tenancies. Slater (2011) 
linked the riots to class territorial stigmatisation and a denial of dignity in cities within the 
reengineering of the neoliberal state building upon the work of Wacquant (2008) on advanced 
marginality.   
 
In this paper, we utilise the sociology of Norbert Elias and historians such as Pinker (2011) to 
explore historical precedents and parallels relating to urban disorder and anti-social behaviour 
(an approach advocated by Rodger (2006; 2008) and Powell and Flint (2009)). We begin by 
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summarising contemporary discourses about ‘Broken Britain’ and the evidence for this and then 
provide an account of Elias’ relevant theories. We continue by presenting three key arguments: 
firstly that a ‘retreat into the present’ by both policy discourse and social science (see Cole, 2001; 
Garrett, 2007) fails to recognise that perceived crises of civilisation are ubiquitous to the urban 
condition; secondly that particular moral panics have always arisen, specifically focused upon 
young and working class populations and urban disorder; and, thirdly, that previous techniques 
of governance to control these populations were often far more similar to contemporary 
mechanisms than commentaries suggest. We conclude that, although history is often invoked in 
contemporary discourses about social crisis, both policy makers and social scientists should 
develop a fuller understanding of the historical sociological consequences of urban change and 
the governmental and policing techniques used to regulate them.  
 
Broken Britain and De-Civilising Processes? 
The paradigm of ‘Broken Britain’ predates the riots of 2011. The previous New Labour 
government’s ‘Respect’ agenda, championed by Prime Minister Tony Blair was founded on a 
belief that ‘values necessary to support respect are becoming less widely held - and that this 
change has led to an increase in disrespectful behaviour’ (Respect Task Force, 2006, p.5; see 
Powell and Flint, 2009). An increasing policy focus on the concept of ‘resilience’ was utilised to 
confront uncertainties arising from environmental emergencies, terrorism and social conflict 
(Cabinet Office, 2009). The Conservative’s defining of a ‘Broken Britain’ has been persistently 
articulated from 2006, with the Prime Minister arguing that ‘huge cultural changes were 
required within communities lacking the abilities to cope with modern life’ (Cameron, 2010; 
Conservative Party, 2010) and this understanding of de-civilising tendencies in particular 
communities was also shared by some critics of governmental policy (Rodger, 2008).  The Social 
Justice Policy Group’s Breakdown Britain report (2006) re-articulated a long-standing concern 
about an ever growing "underclass" while Alan Duncan MP (2007) described, in a speech to the 
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Centre for Policy Studies, the need to ‘re-civilise Britain’ to counter a ‘real life Lord of the Flies’ 
(imagery also used by Melanie Phillips (2011) in immediate response to the riots).   For 
commentators such as Browne (2008) Britons have a widespread sense of decline in morals or 
values and ‘despite some moral improvements’, family breakdown, drug and alcohol abuse and 
welfare dependency have ‘unequivocally increased’ in the last two decades whilst a decline in 
social capital is ‘evident’ (ibid, pp.1-2). Browne argues that, compared to the Victorian era, there 
has been a ’disappearance of deference’ citing declining (Christian) church attendance and the 
decimation of the value of hard work.  Browne’s thesis neglects a wealth of historical evidence 
about the ambiguities of attitudes to the Church and other authorities, very high levels of 
alcohol and drug consumption and violence in the Victorian era, the prevalence of graffiti and 
vandalism and, indeed, early acts of urban ‘terrorism’ such as the spate of bomb attacks on 
London post offices in 1894 (Butterworth, 2010; Hunt, 2004; Kneale, 2001; O’Neill, 2006; 
Pearson, 2009). But Browne cites survey studies indicating that this thesis is widely shared by 
the British population, with a perceived decline in morals, respect for authority and an increase 
in anti-social behaviour.  
 
However, Griffith et al. (2011), in a Young Foundation report, state that there is lack of ‘objective 
evidence’ for a decline in civility; arguing that Britain remains a well-mannered and courteous 
society where casual violence and racism have declined, as have perceptions of anti-social 
behaviour during the 2000s (see Upson, 2006), whilst neighbourliness and volunteering may 
have increased; although they link ‘high streets descending into violence’ in the riots of 2011 
with parts of housing estates becoming ‘no-go areas’ and antagonisms between occupants of 
different housing tenures. The important role of Think Tanks should be noted here, including 
the Centre for Social Justice headed by Iain Duncan Smith, and the Young Foundation with 
strong links to the New Labour governments (see Welshman (2012) for a historical account of 
the links between research and policy on cycles of deprivation and ‘problem families’). The 
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dystopian portrayals of deprived neighbourhoods have also been powerfully challenged by 
Mooney (2009). Griffith et al. (2011) locate civility as an important dimension of interactions 
with strangers which increase in modern societies (‘we have to be so polite because we’re so 
different’ (p.26)) although they suggest that this generates new flashpoints, rather than the 
wider and longer-term inculcation of self-restraint and the ‘sharpening of the regulation and 
binding of the emotional economy’ hypothesised by Elias (2000, p.106; see also Pinker, 2011) 
and others (de Swaan, 1995; Wouters, 1986, 2007). Freud’s work, which of course influenced 
Elias greatly, offers something of a synthesis between these two arguments, suggesting that 
civilisation intensified the repression of an instinctual life and magnified anxiety as modern life 
created a permanent irreconcilability between individual drives and social demands (see Overy, 
2010, p.161). 
 
Griffith et al. correctly argue for a wider definition of civility beyond etiquette (which is often 
based on an insider/outsider nexus, as identified by Elias and Scotson (1994)). It is also the case 
that discourses of civility and civilisation are predominately defined based on the prejudices 
and expectations of a self-conscious cultural tradition of the educated and dominant classes, 
which emphasises ‘high’ culture and polite social behaviour (Elias, 2000; Overy, 2010, p.23). 
This civic landscape, constructed through language, buildings, rituals and symbols, dominates 
the representation of the urban (and its problems) to itself (Croll, 1999; Hunt, 2004). Within 
these representations, concern with the welfare of working class populations has always 
coincided simultaneously with fears about their morality. These were combined in early 
industrial legislation including the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802 (see Adams, 2010) 
and accounts of the industrial city, such as James Philip Kay’s (1832) The Moral and Physical 
Condition of the Working Classes Employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester. This conflict 
of laissez-faire economics and utilitarian moralities of public welfare, developed in the 1830s, is 
still being played out in the conditions of neoliberal late modernity (Adams, 2010, p.242) and 
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the coexistence of concern for welfare and social fear has important implications for our 
understanding of social processes.  Indeed, Elias (1987a) stressed the relationship between 
knowledge and emotions - most notably the 'safety-danger balance' which shapes the level of 
social fears within society - and it is to this theoretical body of work that we now turn.  
 
Norbert Elias, the retreat into the present and civilisation as an ambivalent process 
It is our contention that the long-term, detached and process-oriented sociology of Norbert Elias 
provides appropriate theoretical tools for understanding the ubiquity of crises of civilisation.  
Elias' synthesis can also elaborate the striking similarities in terms of the governance of 
"problematic" populations within different periods of crisis and the targeted nature of these 
techniques of control.  We therefore wish to focus on two salient aspects of Elias' sociology 
relevant to the discussion that follows.  Firstly, we discuss Elias's sociology of knowledge and its 
relationship to emotions through a focus on his concept of the 'retreat into the present' (Elias, 
1987b).  Secondly, we explore the notion of ambivalence in Elias's work with reference to social 
relations and the counter-currents evident within the overall civilizing process. 
 
One of the striking aspects of responses to the 2011 riots in English cities, and indeed 
contemporary urban disorder more broadly, is the commonality in responses from political, 
media and academic sources.  These responses are largely related to immediate concerns about 
moral decline and respect within today’s society and often fail to garner insights from the 
experiences of earlier societies.  Using Norbert Elias’ theory of involvement and detachment 
(1987a) we would argue that this represents a ‘retreat into the present’ (1987b) on the part of 
social scientists, politicians and social commentators alike.  The theory of involvement and 
detachment is central to Elias’ theoretical synthesis and runs through much of his work.  For 
Elias, human knowledge (and therefore the development of the social sciences) is bound up in 
the development of overall society and therefore unplanned and unforeseen (see Goudsblom, 
8 
 
1977).  According to Elias, the concepts of involvement and detachment are not separate, indeed 
varying degrees of both are always present, but can be best understood as the unattainable 
extreme poles of a spectrum (i.e. total involvement at one end and total detachment at the 
other), along which the dynamic interplay of the two varies: sometimes more involved and less 
detached, and vice versa:  
'Only small babies, and among adults perhaps only insane people, become involved in whatever 
they experience with complete abandon to their feelings here and now; and again only the 
insane can remain totally unmoved by what goes on around them. Normally adult behaviour 
lies on a scale somewhere between these two poles' (Elias, 1987a, p.3). 
 
As far as sociology is concerned it is the continuum that lies between these marginal poles that 
presents the principal problem: the positioning of people on this continuum and the criteria for 
different degrees of involvement and detachment.  Elias clarifies his use of this terminology and 
says, when speaking of involvement and detachment, 'one refers in short to changing equilibria 
between sets of mental activities which in humans' relations with other humans, with non-
human objects and with themselves have the function to involve and detach' (Elias, 1987a, p.4).   
 
Elias contrasts the position of the institutionalized and more detached natural scientist with 
that of the social scientist. Over the long-term humans' control of emotions in their experience 
of nature has increased compared to earlier societies: previously people had very little control 
over natural forces, were often dependent on them for their survival, and thus plagued by 
insecurity.  It is not difficult to understand that they could not help but experience natural events 
with strong feelings and emotions: 'they were too deeply involved to look at natural phenomena, 
like distant observers, calmly' (Elias, 1987a, p.8).  Elias refers to this situation as the 'double-
bind' process: a higher danger level perpetuating a higher affect in emotional responses.  It is the 
presence of this 'double-bind process' in humans' experiences of social phenomena - in people's 
relations with each other - which resonates with concerns over urban disorder, anti-social 
behaviour and the 'fear of crime' linked to an increasingly pervasive societal discourse of urban 
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and moral decline.  And furthermore, this double-bind process is an inherent characteristic of 
the human and urban condition.  That is: 
 
'While in people's relations with non-human forces the standard of both the control of self and 
that of external events is relatively high, in relations of people with people the socially required 
and socially bred standard of both is considerably lower' (Elias, 1987a, p.11). 
 
As Elias points out problems of knowledge are often discussed as if knowledge existed in a 
human vacuum, without reference to human beings or their condition and personality (1987a, 
p.67) - a perspective central to his vehement rejection of philosophy.  His criticisms of the 
western philosophical tradition were fervent and consistent, particularly over the conception of 
the person (in the singular) as the subject of knowledge emphasised by Descartes, Locke and 
Kant among others (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, p.33). Elias is highly critical of 
contemporary sociologists1 who still uncritically draw upon philosophy and the range of static  
antinomies it perpetuates (e.g. truth/falsity; rational/irrational) (Kilminster, 1998); sociologists 
who have confined themselves to the issues of the present and in the process have lost the 
ground gained by the battles and advances of the earlier sociological pioneers such as Marx or 
Weber (Kilminster, 1987, p.216), both of whom looked to the past when seeking the answers to 
the problems of their own societies: 
'The preoccupation of the sociologists with the social problems and conflicts of the present 
represents a dominance of involved thinking - they are highly emotionally absorbed in those 
problems and issues.  Their very involvement indeed galvanizes them in the pursuit of short-
term, empirical knowledge in order to illuminate the problems about which they feel so 
strongly' (Kilminster, 1987, p.216). 
 
Thus the need for a long-term, detached perspective in responding to incidences of urban 
disorder is crucial to our understanding: an emotionally-driven retreat into the present can 
serve to blind us to historical precedents and long-term social processes and block the path to 
an understanding of what is unique about the present situation.  This retreat can also be 
particularly damaging where it results in short-term social misdiagnoses of contemporary 
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problems (Kilminster, 2008) and the legitimization of civilising offensives (Powell and Flint, 
2009; Powell, 2010; Rodger, 2008); both of which have a tendency to be targeted at particular 
stigmatised (outsider) groups.  To summarize, a higher danger level in our experience of 
relations with other people perpetuates a higher level of emotional response.  In terms of the 
current discourse, as involvement gains the upper hand, this is manifested in insecurity and a 
social fear of certain populations and urban spaces, and perpetuated by pervasive and 
unproblematised constructions of the 'causes of decline' (note how decline is a given).  The 
"current crisis" is then accentuated by unfavourable comparisons with previous societies, which 
are invariably based on a romanticised and nostalgic perspective of bygone eras (e.g. the 
relative "tranquility" and "civility" of the Victorian era).   
 
For our purposes here, it is useful to complement this notion of a retreat into the present, 
precipitated by involved thinking, with a brief discussion of the inherent ambivalence of social 
relations that characterise civilizing processes.  Central to Elias's sociology is the assertion that 
human figurations are in a constant state of flux: 'civilized and uncivilized [or "decivilized"] do 
not constitute an antithesis of the kind that exists between "good" and "bad", but represent 
stages in a development which, moreover, is still continuing'  (Elias, 2000, p.52).  Again, the 
long-term nature of social development is crucial to our understanding: 'In each phase there are 
numerous fluctuations, frequent advances or recessions of the internal and external constraints.  
An observation of such fluctuations, particularly those close to us in time, can easily obscure the 
general trend' (Elias, 2000, p.157; see also Pinker, 2011).  Elias gives the example of the 
perceived relaxation of morals between the post-WWI and pre-WWII period (see below for 
more on this period) - a time of heightened sensitivity to the notion of an erosion of morals 
within society:  
'And seen at close quarters...it seems to lead to a relaxation of the constraints imposed on 
individuals by social life.  But on closer examination it is not difficult to perceive that this is 
merely a very slight recession, one of the fluctuations that constantly arise from the complexity 
of the historical movement within each phase of the total process' (Elias, 2000, p.157).   
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This notion of divergent phases within the overall, long-term civilizing process has been 
developed further by Cas Wouters in his theory of informalization, defined as ‘the trend towards 
diminishing formality and rigidity in the regimes of manners and emotions and towards 
increasing behavioural and emotional alternatives’ (Wouters, 2007, p.8) (see Powell and Flint, 
2009; Powell, 2010).  These shifts and counter-trends inherent in civilizing processes can 
certainly serve to heighten perceptions of a loss of self-restraint and moral decline but, yet again, 
it is the involved thinking which results in a misreading of such processes (Kilminster, 2008) as 
'people can frequently see nothing in these changes other than degeneration into disorder.  It 
appears merely as an expression of a loosening of the code of behaviour and feeling, without 
which a society must fall into destruction' (Elias quoted in Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998, 
p.245). 
 
In what follows we draw upon these theoretical standpoints and take a long-term perspective in 
suggesting the recurrence of crises of civilisation as a characteristic of the urban condition and 
point to common historical responses to these perceived crises. 
 
A Perpetual Crisis of the Present 
According to Judt (2010, p.8) ‘we have entered an age of insecurity - economic insecurity, 
physical insecurity, political insecurity’, characterised by deep seated anxieties about change 
and narratives of uncertainty and decline (see also Hall, 2007; Sibley, 2003) and a loss of 
ontological security as the constancy of social and material environments is perpetually 
undermined (Giddens, 1990).  The roots of our present condition or ‘malaise’ (Overy, 2010) are 
often identified from the 1970s, described as ‘an age of anxiety’ (Mackay, 1993) or ‘angst society’ 
(Scott, 2000). Three features dominate this paradigm of a contemporary crisis. Firstly, that 
social solidarities have declined and consequently a ‘habitus of self-restraint has unravelled’ 
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(Pratt, 2005) as materialism and selfishness dominate contemporary life and the social 
stigmatisation of lower social groups intensifies (Judt, 2010; Jones, 2011; Slater, 2011). 
Secondly, that in this age of ‘liquid life’ (Bauman, 2005) the fragility of routines and habits 
creates a ‘vertigo’ of late modernity’ (Young, 2007). Thirdly, that we become ever more aware of 
risks (Beck, 1992) and the insecurities and precariousness of our present position (Colic-
Peisker and Johnson, 2010).   
 
We set out three arguments in response. Firstly, that conceptualisations of the fraying of old 
ideas of discipline or order in cities need to be located within ‘ceaseless narratives of decline’ 
(Pearson, 2009) and that, far from contemporary society being subject to a uniquely perceived 
moment of crisis, such moments are inherent and ubiquitous to the human and urban condition.  
As Overy (2010) describes, these are represented as threats to ‘our way of life’ that persist even 
in periods of relative stability and/or prosperity.  These crises extend beyond specific moral 
panics (Ben-Yehuda and Goode, 1994; Cohen, 1972) although these are important and we 
provide examples. But these panics are symptomatic of a wider context in which a crisis of 
civilisation, and discursive and governmental responses, are a constant feature of urban and 
national histories. Secondly, we argue that specific concerns about urban disorder and young 
people have previous parallels and precedents that have been under-represented in 
contemporary social science. Thirdly, we suggest that, linked to this, there is considerable 
continuity in practices of governance in the fields of anti-social behaviour, and how these are 
responded to by the subjects of these practices,  which require further attention.  
 
We acknowledge that the proponents of a contemporary age of insecurity are aware of 
historical precedents and their ambiguities and the persistence of perceptions of moral decline 
in each generation (Browne, 2008; Judt, 2010; Slater, 2011). We also accept that, as Elias (2000) 
and Pinker (2011) have demonstrated, forms of social restraint and control do change; and that 
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these changes reflect corresponding alterations in standards of conduct driven by dynamic 
social relations and changing power balances that characterise human figurations (Elias, 2000; 
Wouters, 1986, 2007).  For example Charles Booth (1967) noted how the habit of smoking in 
the street became socially acceptable in the later 19th century when previously it had been 
inadmissible. Similarly, Sennett (1993) discusses 'revolts against the past' by women in urban 
cities around 1890 in relation to the process of the 'de-Victorianizing' of clothes.  We also agree 
with previous studies that have identified specific civilising offensives, how they reflect the 
standards of particular phases of development (Elias, 2000) and how these can also involve 
enhanced or relaxed social or governmental control, for example prohibition in the Unites States 
in the early 20th century (Ben-Yahuda and Goode, 1994) or the increasing persecution of 
homosexuals in Georgian London in the 1720s (Cruickshank, 2010).  
 
But we suggest the need for a more explicit articulation of history in these accounts. This 
matters because it is vital to our sociological understanding and to our assessment of current 
regimes of governance. Historical traditions have contributed to sociology and analysis of 
regimes of governance, including the oral and cultural history works of Wilmott and Young 
(1957) and Hoggart (1957), the social economic histories of Bottomore (1964) on elites, and 
class structure and genealogies of governance (Foucault, 1977). This is not simply an abstract 
discussion of previous, but disconnected, cycles of history. Rather, their direct linkages to the 
present must be better understood. For example, the tenacity of historic neighbourhoods and 
their spatial boundaries, identities and social stigmas frame contemporary action, such that 
‘ghosts run the city’ (Berman, 1988; Body-Gendrot, 2000; Fraser, 1996; Robertson et al., 2008) 
and place is perpetually possessed by what Bowden (2011, p.15) terms ‘time-deepened 
psychogeographies.’ This also requires us to reinvestigate our understanding of urban form and 
its dynamics. For example, Cruickshank (2010) shows how much of the Georgian architecture 
now much vaunted in our towns and cities was a result of unstable property speculation in 
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response to short-term profit motives equivalent to the contemporary processes much critiqued 
as being responsible for the failures of urban planning and housing crises. Cruickshank also 
argues that this architecture was significantly financed by the economics of the Georgian sex 
industry.  In presenting historical cases, we wish to move beyond a simple argument that ‘the 
good old days’ never existed or that we have been here before. Rather, we wish to promote an 
Eliasian perspective to support the thesis of Pinker (2011) that, in historical terms, in many 
western cities there is less violence, increasing levels of restraint and that life has become less 
dangerous.  
 
Our first argument is that periods of perceived crisis in the urban condition are ubiquitous in 
western societies.   For example, the period between 1871 and 1917 has been characterised as 
an age of decadence and degeneration and a moment of crisis in western cities (Butterworth, 
2010).  Overy (2010) describes the decades of the 1920s and 1930s in Britain as a ‘morbid’ age 
and a ‘crisis of civilisation’, in which anxiety, along with ‘the glittering promise of mass 
consumption and a narcotic hedonism’ was a defining feature of culture (ibid, p.2).  Beatrice 
Webb’s description of a 1920s ‘moral miasma’ characterised by ‘an atmosphere of morbid 
alcoholism and sexuality, furtive larceny and unashamed mendacity’ (quoted in Overy, 2010, 
p.70) resonates powerfully with commentaries on urban Britain in the 21st Century, including 
the perceived rise of a ‘barbarous underclass’ (ibid) and the focus on single mothers in post-
riots rhetoric (Phillips, 2011), within a long tradition of problematising the sexual conduct of 
working class women (Cruikshank, 2010; Stokoe, 2003).  Alarmist reports on crime, 
prostitution and delinquency in the 1920s and 1930s were entwined with the development of 
eugenics and the first usage of the term ‘social problem group’.  It is also notable that this 
timeframe (often labelled the 'Roaring Twenties') corresponds to the 'wave of informalization', 
identified by Wouters (2007), and concerns over standards of behaviour and promiscuity as 
Brighton emerged as a 'dirty weekend' destination (Shields, 1990) for instance. 
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Of course, the presence of previous periods of crisis does not necessarily invalidate arguments 
that we are living through a contemporary period characterised by crisis or a retreat from 
progress or security in the immediately preceding epoch. For many contemporary 
commentators, the period from the second world war to the mid-1970s in western societies 
may retrospectively be understood as a ‘bubble’ of prosperous security and relative comfort 
(Judt, 2010, p.52) in which, for example, unemployed populations would not have aspersions 
cast upon them and where working class communities were less subject to social opprobrium 
(Judt, 2010; Jones, 2011). Or, as Wouters (1986) puts it, a period when people were gradually 
more inclined to identify with the underdog in recognition of the fact that unequal relations 
were "unharmonious".  However, we would counter this by suggesting that, despite evident 
progressive social programmes and increasing material equality in relative terms, a more 
detailed understanding of this period would reveal the ambiguities and distinctions towards 
and within working class populations and the project of the welfare state (Elias, 1994; Hoggart, 
1957; Kynaston, 2008, 2010; Young and Wilmott, 1957).  
 
In addition, juvenile delinquency and a loss of work ethic remained a ‘pressing concern’ in the 
post- war years as did the perceived need to ‘reclaim delinquents for the nation’ (Kynaston, 
2008, p.367).  For example, in 1955 a prominent report entitled Citizens of Tomorrow claimed 
that recruits to the armed forces ‘had a poor physique, poor education and lacked religious 
knowledge, self-confidence, initiative and a sense of responsibility’ (Kynaston, 2010, p.548), 
mirroring the discourses about young people in contemporary Britain, preceding and following 
the riots in 2011. So, just as crises of urban civilisations have their historical parallels, the 
juxtaposition of neo-liberalism with its preceding decades corresponds with the First World 
War being represented as a fracture from pre-war expectations of relentless advance (Overy, 
2010), or conditions in Victorian cities including morals, sexual conduct and indulgence in 
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‘stimulants’ during the Industrial Revolution destroying Georgian motifs of urban patriotism 
and progress (Hall, 1998; Hunt, 2004).  
 
Liquid Modernity and its Vertigo 
Before turning to urban disorder, it is worth making a more general point about the extent to 
which the sociology of contemporary urban conditions may be regarded as specific to our own 
epoch. We have already identified how influential works by Bauman (2005), Young (2007), 
Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) have characterised contemporary life as one of bewildering 
economic and social change.  A life in which risk becomes ever more prominent and anchors of 
tradition, habit and community become unsettled with the speed of rapidly evolving 
communications, technologies, employment practices, population flows and the new skills 
required to navigate these conditions.  Indeed, Griffith et al. (2011, p.33) explicitly link these 
trends to civilising processes, arguing that ‘old-fashioned civility could also be a means of coping 
with the constant flux of modernity’. However, we would argue that such ‘ontological insecurity’ 
(Giddens, 1990) is equivalent to previous periods in its emotional and social effects upon 
certain populations. For example, accounts of cities in England during the Industrial Revolution 
abound with descriptions of the importance of time to London’s ‘rushing citizens’ (Adams, 2011, 
p.233); ‘the step of haste’, ‘how hurried men are’, ‘how they are terrifically chased into double-
quick speed’ and how the world moves at a ‘smarter pace’ than before as the new metropolis 
‘accelerated the rhythm of exchange and ceaselessly stirred up men’s lives’  (see Hall, 1998; 
Hunt, 2004;). Robert Park identified similar phenomena in Chicago in the 1920s: ‘Everything is 
loose and free, but everything is problematic’ (Introduction to Zorbaugh, 1929, p. xviii) and, in 
the same period in Britain there was an ‘increase in nervous instability due to the rush of 
modern life...and general uncertainty as to the future’ (Overy, 2010, p.134). Traditional 
attachments were viewed as vanishing in these new cities as ‘not even gossip’ sustained social 
interactions and belonging (Toynbee, 1884; Zorbaugh, 1929). Similarly, Beck’s important work 
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on risk in late modernity (1992) requires cognisance of previous periods when our relationship 
with the future has been reframed.  For example, as Dillon (2006, p.380) argues, during the 
early 18th Century when through gambling, stock-dealing and insurance the future became 
calculable, challenging the religiously-dominated pre-determinism of previous ages.  So, 
although Judt (2010, p.1) may still be correct to suggest that ‘something is profoundly wrong 
with the way we live today’ and  ‘that there was a time when we ordered our lives differently’ 
(ibid, p.39) we do need a more precise understanding about what is unique or different about 
the sociological effects of contemporary changes on urban populations.  
 
Urban Disorders, Gangs and Young People 
The historical precedents for the riots in English cities and towns in August 2011 are evident. In 
1898, during a particularly hot British summer, the media and political classes were exercised 
by concerns about August bank holidays and celebrations leading to drunkenness, fighting, 
street robberies and assaults (Savage, 2007, p.904). Similarly, Charles Booth documented 
concerns about the ‘abandonment of restraint’, including sexual conduct, on bank holidays 
(Booth, 1967, p.308). These particular temporal and spatial events were located in a longer 
history of gangs, including female gangs, for example in New York in the 1850s and a narrative 
of increasing juvenile delinquency featuring gangs with clearly demarcated neighbourhood 
territories and large scale urban disorder, for example a battle of ‘Scuttlers’ in Manchester in 
1890 involving at least 500 participants (Savage, 2007).  As Davies notes, ‘scuttling gangs were 
neighbourhood-based youth gangs which were formed in working class districts across the 
Manchester conurbation’ (Davies, 1998, p.2) in the late nineteenth century.   Indeed, there is a 
clear resonance with twenty-first century anti-social behaviour discourses in Davies’ account.  
For example, in a court hearing regarding a street robbery by a scuttling gang one Inspector 
went as far as to say that the four defendants were from a ‘gang of scuttlers, who were the 
terror of the neighbourhood they infested’ (Davies, 1999, p.82) - a statement containing clear 
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echoes of the post-riots media discourse on ‘feral families’ and ‘wild beasts’ (Hastings, 2011; 
White, 2011).  Not only in terms of the dehumanization of the 'problem' (i.e. 'infestations' versus 
'feral youth') but it would also appear that similar discursive constructions are evident between 
the two eras, with the respectable clearly distinguished from the anti-social or the morally 
unsound minority. As ever, at the time these were conceptualised as ‘new developments’ with a 
new class of ‘city boy’ or ‘slum denizen’. Savage (2007) and Pearson (2009) identify how 
problematic youth groups such as the ‘apaches’ of Paris (or later Sheffield in the 1920s, see Bean, 
1981) or ‘hooligans’ of British cities (see Daily Telegraph, 2011) were largely a media creation 
amplifying the behaviour of a minority into a generalised climate of fear (see Cohen, 1972).  
‘The “Hooligan” was to embark on a spectacular official career in the early years of the 
twentieth century.  He would appear, if not in person then at least in name, before numerous 
committees of inquiry into the troubled state of the nation.  He loomed large in the inspirations 
for Baden-Powell’s Boy Scouts…He would be feared by some as the herald of a dark hour in the 
nations affairs’ (Pearson, 2009, p.53) 
 
But what is striking is how the underpinning causes of youth delinquency, epitomised in street 
disorder, were historically described in terms and concepts that mirror almost identically the 
current responses to the 2011 riots. Savage (2007) describes how, a century before ‘hoodies’, 
connections were made between dress style and delinquency (a process continued through the 
mods and rockers of the 1960s and the football casuals of the 1980s). Supposed ‘unfulfilled 
desires for consumption’ epitomised youth delinquency in the first half of the 20th Century just 
as acquisitive looting, materialism, brands and marketing have dominated post-riot debates in 
2011 (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012; Slater, 2011; see also Bauman, 1998). 
Additionally, the rejection of salaried work and conflict within families was applied to earlier 
youth disturbances (Savage, 2007) just as the lack of a work ethic and family breakdown are 
defining features of the current ‘Broken Britain’ paradigm.  Beyond actual urban disorder, young 
people ‘loaf[ing] around the streets’ in large and "embarrassing" crowds were problematic for 
the police and commentators of the 1890s and 1930s alike (Booth, 1967; Savage, 2007). 
Increases in juvenile delinquency figures in both England and Germany during the First World 
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War were further linked to a lack of the presence of fathers or other male authority figures, pre-
empting the identification of a lack of responsible fatherhood as a key catalyst for the 2011 riots 
(Cameron, 2011; Centre for Social Justice, 2011; Savage, 2007, p.161).  
 
Techniques of Governance 
There are also powerful similarities in the techniques of governance and mechanisms of 
policing urban disorder that need to be understood before identifying ‘new’ methods of 
regulation in the neoliberal period. Some of the trends regularly cited as specific features of 
contemporary society existed previously. For example, the legitimacy and authority of police 
officers and urban park attendants in the period from 1880 to 1930 was constantly challenged 
and undermined, with offenders regularly ignoring, ridiculing and, in some cases, assaulting 
these figures of government (Bean, 1981; Croll, 1999; Marne, 2001). In addition, neighbours 
were often afraid to give evidence because of fear of reprisals (Pearson, 2009).  
 
Governmental and policing responses often involved methods that mirror those of today, 
including exceptional powers in response to specific events. Following a series of disorders at 
northern racecourse meetings in the summer of 1925 the Home Secretary considered a short 
Act of Parliament empowering magistrates to inflict heavier punishments for gang hooliganism 
based solely on police evidence (Bean, 1981), and new forms of policing were utilised from the 
Victorian era onwards to address violence and incivility related to football matches (Curry, 
2007; Davies, 2006; Pearson, 2009). The contemporary use of Anti-social Behaviour Orders and 
Dispersal Orders which limit the spatial movement and social association of individuals have 
their precedent in the tactics of the Flying Squad in mid-1920s Sheffield instigating a rule that 
gang members were not allowed to congregate or travel in groups of more than three (Bean, 
1981). As with the responses to the 2011 riots, these were conceived as exceptional and 
temporary measures to address a specific and magnified moment of urban disorder.   
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The current debate about alcohol pricing and the regulation of licensed premises and the night-
time economy, and techniques such as Pub Watch which link establishments and prohibit 
individuals from entering these establishments (Hadfield, 2006) replicate police pressure on 
landlords not to serve gang members in 1920s Sheffield (Bean, 1981); or the use of a black list 
in late Victorian Merthyr Tydfil, which included the names and photographs of offenders, who 
could be excluded for up to three years, being circulated to all publicans (Croll, 1999, p.264). 
This technique was similar to the use of the expanding local press to publicise details about 
individual transgressors in order to utilise the mechanism of shame to regulate urban space 
(Croll, 1999; Elias, 2000). These have their contemporary corollaries in the publicising of 
individuals subject to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders or the listing of fare avoiders by metro, rail 
and bus companies (Powell and Flint, 2009), or the use of the ‘Not Wanted List’ which presents 
the names and previous addresses of individuals banned from accessing the premises and 
grounds of New York City Housing Authority (see 
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/j12febe.pdf). The limitations of shaming 
mechanisms were identified by Croll (1999, p.266) as some black listed individuals ‘were 
immune to the civilising power of the public gaze’ and ‘revelled in the notoriety’, just as Anti-
social Behaviour Orders are often equated with being a ‘badge of honour’ for those subject to 
them (although empirical research (McIntosh, 2008) challenges this interpretation). As Croll 
(1999) and Elias (2000) suggest, these techniques of governance promote ‘self-control’ as a key 
mechanism for ‘civilising’ the urban landscape. Finally, contemporary debates about the 
responsibility of citizens to ‘stand up’ to anti-social behaviour (Powell and Flint, 2009), the 
emergence of the riots clean-up campaign organised through Twitter (see Castella, 2011) and 
the increasingly complex assemblage of public and private security regimes in our cities have 
their precedents. These include press demands for the formation of a national guard to protect 
property in the period leading to Second Reform Bill of 1832 (Adams, 2010, p.229); the 
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‘vigilance committees’ of late Victorian Britain (Croll, 1999); and organisations such as the 
Society for Reformation of Manners (who actively used agent provocateurs to prosecute 
homosexuals in Georgian London, Cruickshank, 2010) and the National Council of Public Morals 
and Public Morality Council in Britain in the 1930s.  
 
Conclusions 
In critiquing contemporary understandings of social conditions, it is surely correct to identify 
with Cooke Taylor’s observation in 1842 (quoted in Hunt, 2004, p.209) that populations 
develop new habits or thoughts and actions formed by the circumstances of their conditions.  
From an Eliasian perspective we would also emphasize the role of changing social 
interdependencies in disseminating conduct, and the nature of power balances in shaping these 
new habits and actions.  What we have tried to demonstrate and argue for in this paper is the 
need for a more precise identification of the sociological impacts of contemporary change and 
the specific novel elements of governance which are more informed by historical knowledge.  
Our brief and by no means exhaustive comparison of incivilities and urban disorder has pointed 
to a number of historical continuities which have been neglected by a narrow focus on 
contemporary social concerns: the persistent focus on young people and working class 
populations within historical moral panics; and the similarity in the techniques of governance in 
response to these populations.  We have also suggested that the lack of acknowledgement of 
historical precedents in terms of "crises of civilisation" has its roots in a predominance of 
"involved" thinking which has precipitated a ‘retreat into the present’ and a neglect of long-term 
social processes.   
 
However, once we shift beyond static conceptions and take an approach which emphasises the 
ambivalence of civilising processes we cannot only move towards a better understanding of the 
roots and manifestations of today’s urban antagonisms, but also reveal the areas which might 
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yield fruitful inquiry in understanding what is unique about today’s concerns.  That is, an 
appreciation of historical continuities gives rise to an understanding of difference.  Following 
Elias’ cue, comparison of incivilities in different eras might also be complemented by a detailed 
contrasting of the social relations of those periods, far more extensively than has been possible 
here, in order to illuminate the effects of changing power relations and social processes which 
impact upon behavioural expectations.  For example the contemporary focus on urban youth 
would benefit from an understanding of changes which have impacted upon young people's 
socialisation, varying standards of conduct and power relations relative to earlier eras.  From an 
Eliasian perspective this, in turn, points to important social developments in the UK (and in 
other western European countries) which are absent from prominent accounts of perceived 
decivilising processes and moral and urban decline.  While we have discussed striking 
similarities between different eras, comparison also highlights distinctions which we would 
suggest require detailed investigation if we are to move towards an understanding of what is 
particular about today's manners and behaviour.  For a start, such areas for inquiry might 
include: the changing distance between childhood and adulthood and the different nature of the 
transition to work; tension balances in the proclamation of the rights of children from the mid-
twentieth century onwards; and the varying impact of individualisation processes and changes 
in behavioural expectations.  
 
One of the strengths of Elias' theory is the emphasis placed on the relationship between 
emotions, social processes and knowledge.  As we have argued, this conception is particularly 
helpful in critiquing what is often perceived as a contemporary social malaise.  Perspectives on 
social and moral decline are often charged with emotionally-driven views and ideas about the 
groups and communities at the source of this decline, and this vilification can be accentuated by 
a rise in the 'fear of crime' fuelled by media discourse, moral panic and romanticised views of 
bygone eras (Croll, 1999; Davies, 1999; Curry, 2007).  These interrelated trends impact on 
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perceptions of a relative moral decline and diminution in respect in which these trends are not 
seen as universal, nor in historical perspective, but are aligned with particular 'outsider' groups 
to which those 'in fear' (the established) disidentify from.  This suggests the need for a renewed 
emphasis on historical group relations in any understanding of urban antagonisms.  In Eliasian 
terms, the heightened danger level - whether perceived or real - has a significant bearing on our 
knowledge and views on urban disorder, incivility and civilisation.  Elias (1987a) would argue 
that for those involved in the production of this knowledge there is an imperative need for a 
detached perspective in order to recognise historical precedents, learn from them, and to 
continue the shift towards a higher level of reality-congruent knowledge. 
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1 Elias did not engage in debates with his peers or contemporary sociologists in the conventional sense.  
As Kilminster notes: 'He only obliquely engages with the theories of other writers or schools…This 
abstention from getting involved in contemporary debates is quite deliberate.  It is in order not to be 
diverted from the primary task at hand - empirical research - by elaborate in-house sociological 
discussions' (1987, p.215). 
